.1 indicates that the country's Average IO Corruption-its participation in a network of highly corrupted IOs-is also followed by a worsening in Poland's national Corruption scores, although the worsening is more delayed than in the Thai case. This worsening trend is only temporary: the country also experienced a small improvement in national Corruption (i.e., scores declined), which coincided with a decline in its Average IO Corruption scores during the 1990s. After its accession to the EU in 2004, we observe only a very slight improvement in Poland's Corruption score, without a more sustainable improvement. This is interesting given the common notion that EU membership should have improved Poland's good governance more steadily. 
Appendix F: Avg IO Corruption and Corruption -Other Control Variables
To further check the robustness of our main findings, we now include different sets of additional control variables. First, we add a number of additional political control variables to the model that have been used in other empirical models of corruption (Model 1). Specifically, we control for the number of IO memberships a country has, inter-and intrastate conflict (data from the COW Intra-State and Inter State War Data sets), the amount of FDI inflows to a country as a share of that country's GDP (data are from UNCTAD), whether the country is a presidential system, the government's vote share, the mean district magnitude (log), and the percentage of Protestants. Data for political variables are from the Database of Political Institutions (Beck et al. 2001) , while data for Protestants are from the World Religion Project. Second, we substitute our average Avg IO Corruption measure with a Maximum IO Corruption measure, under the logic that participation in even one highly member-corrupted IO-rather than the average across all memberships-could produce this effect (Model 2). This measure uses the highest corruption score of the IOs that a country is a member of. Third, we substitute our Polity measure for Democracy measure with data by Freedom House (Model 3). Forth, we exclude the measure for Diffusion to test whether the high correlation between Diffusion and Avg IO Corruption may affect the main results (Model 4). Finally, in Model 4 we use a different measure of diffusion. In particular, we add an explanatory variable measuring the average level of corruption in the country's home region, as defined by the Polity IV project. Our main findings are robust across all these specifications. Corruption appears to spread through IOs among members. Standard errors in parentheses * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Appendix G: Avg IO Corruption and Corruption -Other Corruption Measures
We now demonstrate that the findings are robust to using different measures of corruption. Model 1 uses the World Bank's World Governance Indicators (WGI) control of corruption score, which captures perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, as well as capture of the state by elites and private interests (Kaufman et al. 2010) . Model 2 uses Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) score, which measures the perceived level of public sector corruption in a country in a given year. The WGI is available from 1996-2002 (every two years) and then annually until 2013. CPI is available from 1995-2013. Since the methodology for the CPI index changed significantly in 2012, we only include data until 2011. We use the inverse of both indicators (averaged over three-year periods) such that larger values on each variable indicate more corruption. Model 3 uses the World Bank Enterprise Survey's data on bribery incidence, which measures the percentage of firms experiencing at least one bribe payment request. The Bribery Incidence data is available from 2006-2013, with different country coverage each year. Since data availability over time is much lower, we estimate the model without fixed effects, with robust standard errors. Since the dependent variable Bribery (Incidence) is not normally distributed, we use its natural log. Note, that the inclusion of Diffusion leads to a large loss of information in the Model 3. In Model 4, we estimate the Bribery model, but exclude Diffusion to make sure the results are not driven by this loss of data.
In all models, Avg IO Corruption is estimated in the way described in the research design above using these different underlying data, which cover slightly different countries and time periods. The results indicate positive and significant effects for all five specifications. An increase of a country's Avg IO Corruption in a corrupt IO network leads to an increase in the perception of domestic Corruption no matter which index is used.
(1) Standard errors in parentheses * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Appendix H: Avg IO Corruption and Corruption -Other Good Governance Measures
Whereas our theoretical focus is on the spread of corruption, one could argue that IOs may have effects on other indicators of good governance as well. Here, we analyze whether our statistical results transfer to other indicators of good governance. In Model 1, we rely on the World Bank's WGI indicator of Voice and Accountability to capture perceptions of the extent to which a country's citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free media. Model 2 relies on their indicator of the Rule of Law to gauge perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence. Regulatory Quality (Model 3) captures perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector development. Government Effectiveness (Model 4) captures perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies. For all indicators, we calculated the relevant Avg IO Corruption scores, such that for example the level of regulatory quality in a country is affected by the Avg IO Corruption of that country in regional organizations with different average levels of regulatory quality. The results show that our findings on the diffusion of corruption carry over to some other governance indicators (with the exception of the Rule of Law and the Government Effectiveness indicators).
Appendix I: Avg IO Corruption and Corruption -Different IO Types
Here, we analyze the effect of Avg IO Corruption for different types of international organizations, as perhaps corruption is more likely to occur and spread through certain types of organizations. Model 1 includes a measure of Avg IO Corruption that is based on the entire sample of international organizations (including universal and cross-regional organizations). Model 2 generates Avg IO Corruption using only the sample of regional organizations that mainly focus on economic issues, such as trade and finance. Model 3 restricts the sample to regional organizations that focus on political issues, and Model 5 restricts the sample to regional organizations that focus on social issues. The effect of Avg IO Corruption is consistently positive and significant across all those specifications.
(1) Standard errors in parentheses * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 Models 1 and 2 estimate our main model using annual data. Since we would not expect an immediate effect of Avg IO Corruption on national corruption, we lag Avg IO Corruption by one year (Model 1) and two years (Model 2). Model 3 estimates our main model using five-year period data, and Model 4 analyzes a single cross section. Our main findings are robust to these alterations.
(1) 
